Around Juristocracy: The Reallocation of Judicial Authority in Preemption Doctrine

This is an essay at once narrower than, and orthogonal to, the topic of
juristocracy. “Juristocracy” is, of course, Ran Hirschl’s term for a global—or at least
international—expansion of judicial authority consisting in several overlapping strands;
these are, “the constitutionalization of rights, the establishment of judicial review, and the
judicialization of politics.” (Hirschl, 2000). Such an expansion is seen—at least by
Hirschl—as essentially counter-majoritarian and hence anti-democratic. Lochner writ
large and late, the constitutionalization of rights generally (and not just contract rights) is
a sort of rear guard action on the part of fading “elites.” Juristocracy thus serves as a
brake on, among other things, legislatively engineered wealth transfers from the relevant
elites to … everybody else. The notion of juristocracy thus raises fundamental (and
difficult) questions ranging across constitutional theory. At bottom, I think, are concerns
about efficiency and equity raised by the establishment and exercise of the judicial
power. I have no correspondingly general argument or theory to offer in response to such
concerns. Here, I intend merely to discuss one aspect of the U.S. Court’s federalism. In
particular, I wish to consider certain shifts in judicial power attending the development of
the Rehnquist Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
Recent decades have seen an expansion of preemption doctrine as traditionally
understood, especially with respect to notions of implied preemption and regulatory
authority. (Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta; Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., etc.) That expansion, as it favors the domain of federal authority over
the domain of state authority, runs counter to the simplest caricature of the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism. It also involves, among other things, at least a marginal diminution
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of authority for one set of judges—as the set of state law claims over which they may
preside is diminished—coincident with a certain tension, and perhaps a shift in power,
between state courts generally and the federal Court. At the same time, this aspect of the
Court’s federalism may be seen as serving the interest of certain corporate elites more
clearly, or more durably, than the more general swing towards state (versus federal)
power.
There are several reasons why such a parochial discussion might be of interest in
the larger comparative debate. First, whereas the larger debate generally regards the
judicial reassignment (or re-calibration) of legislative authority, this is an opportunity to
attend to a rich example of judicial activity with respect to the scope of administrative
authority. That is a topic of ongoing interest, not just in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence, but in, e.g., the European Union and its member states. Second,
application of implied preemption principles makes conspicuous very general questions
about the rationality or efficiency of fundamental elements of federal design (questions
considered explicitly in the Marshall Court’s early exploration of implied preemption in
M’Culloch v. Maryland). Third, the debate about the rationalization of regulatory
schema takes place against the backdrop of a highly active and diverse body of civil
litigation; that provides, on the one hand, an opportunity to raise questions about
democracy and distribution beyond the legislative realm and, on the other, a rich domain
in which to examine the effects, on the ground, of a certain form of judicial (re)allocation.
For example, we can ask about popular access to the courts on the one hand and
background rates of litigation activity, substitution effects, and so forth, on the other.
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My discussion will proceed as follows: first, I mean to review briefly the
reemergence of implied preemption doctrine and its application to the regulatory arena.
Second, I mean to consider arguments on behalf of regulatory preemption in a particular
(and heavily litigated) regulatory domain, that of the regulations and administrative
activities of the United States federal Food and Drug Administration. Pace Medtronic,
this is a domain where recent preemption doctrine has achieved a striking purchase in the
federal Courts of Appeal and even, to an extent, the state courts. It is also a domain
where the statements (and ad hoc litigation activities) of the regulatory agency itself have
played a significant role in shaping the federal-state balance struck by the courts. Third, I
mean to consider efficiency and equity aspects of regulatory rationalization in this
domain. I will suggest that a strong version of regulatory preemption is at least narrowly
efficient in the FDA domain in ways that, e.g., mere regulatory deference cannot be.
More broadly, however, preemption itself fails to address several of the central functions
served by the body of tort law that it circumscribes: (a) the broader efficiency served by
enterprise liability and (b) the distributional (and democratic) effects of citizens’ access to
the courts as fora in which to seek redress for corporate harms. That failure may be
subject to repair, but not via preemption doctrine alone.
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